

ENDANGERED SPECIES:
An Agroterrorism Simulation Field Exercise

FINAL REPORT

Prepared for:

Reno County Emergency Planning Committee
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and

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Abstract

Field exercise *Endangered Species*, held at Hutchinson (KS), 10/6/04, was an advanced level of testing for law enforcement's capacity to *prevent* the intentional introduction of a foreign animal disease (FAD) at a public event, such as a state fair. Prevention of any FAD is based on law enforcement's ability to analyze a series of reported suspicious events, link these separate events, and correctly disseminate threat intelligence to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) for appropriate action. This series of events requires close coordination by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. One hundred seven (107) individuals, representing forty-seven (47) different agencies from three (3) states participated in this field exercise.

Exercise Objectives:

- Measure law enforcement's capacity to receive, refine, and report intelligence data;
- Measure law enforcement's capacity to respond to early warning signs indicating the presence of a serious threat;
- Identify weaknesses in the intelligence network which is designed to analyze criminal information, link suspicious activities, and disseminate a potential threat to law enforcement for appropriate action; and
- Strengthen law enforcement's awareness and response to early warning signs of an emerging threat for the objective of safeguarding vulnerable targets.

Exercise Scenario: A 24-year-old male suspect with extremist views and linked to an international terrorist organization attempts to disrupt the upcoming national election with the intentional introduction of an FAD at a public event (state fair). The scenario centered around a series of suspicious activities that are reported to local law enforcement, and linked by intelligence analysts to one suspect. The suspicious events took place in Texas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Kansas. The heartland of America was chosen as the target of agroterrorism for its recognition as a "soft" target. The destructive agents (i.e., biological and explosives) represented potential loss of life and severe economic implications. As events unfold, the exercise group was challenged to identify potential threats and place safeguards at targeted events.

Findings:

- Clear communication is the key to the successful resolution of any multi-agency crisis, and this exercise was no exception. Confusion arose throughout the exercise with the lack of understanding and misinterpretation of terms, acronyms, and language usage by the various agencies.
- Rumors, half-truths, and speculation must be eliminated at the outset of any crisis. Disruption at a public event has great potential for causing panic and over-reaction by the public. Agencies must understand and address crisis communication.

Recommendations:

- Law enforcement should establish effective liaison with the media in order to provide the public with *accurate* information on technical subjects involving public health and animal health during a potential threat of terrorism. Ethnic diversity and language barriers must be addressed.
- A common dictionary for terms and acronyms should be developed and published for the benefit of all first-responding agencies.
- It is imperative the communication gap between agriculture and law enforcement be closed in order to promote: sharing of information, reporting of suspicious activity, and understanding the role of law enforcement in preventing agroterrorism.
- More awareness and training is needed for local law enforcement to make regular usage of sophisticated state and federal computerized databanks, such as: KsLEIN, KsTIC, TSC, TTIC, and others. Our nation's intelligence network is dependent upon a coordinated flow of information, raw data, tips, and "hunches," beginning with the public and local law enforcement. **Prevention of an agroterrorism act may very well begin with a suspect query by local law enforcement.**
- Local, state, and federal law enforcement must make a commitment to the aggressive recruitment of human intelligence sources in order to prevent acts of terrorism, including an act of agroterrorism. Historically, informant information and tips from the public have played a key role in law enforcement's capacity to thwart criminal activity.

Overall Assessment of Endangered Species:

All participants are commended for their willingness to work through this exercise under the scrutiny of 100 participants and four professional evaluators. This willingness demonstrates a genuine commitment to continuous improvement for emergency services, including preparedness for an act of agroterrorism. The Reno County Sheriff's Office, Hutchinson Police Department, Hutchinson Fire Department, Reno County Emergency Management, Reno County Health Department, and members of the Local Emergency Planning Committee all performed in a highly professional and responsive manner throughout this field exercise.

Sheriff Henderson and Chief Heitschmidt provided strong leadership through effective coordination of local, state, and federal agencies. It was readily apparent that the Reno County/Hutchinson agencies have developed a close working relationship with key agriculture personnel, as well as the State Fair Board. The most basic component of building partnerships is *trust*, and a high level of trust and respect was projected by law enforcement agencies in Reno County and Hutchinson. This partnership has been forged through daily liaison, training exercises, and joint operations, as well as a series of actual emergencies within this community.

Schedule of Events

Endangered Species: an agroterrorism simulation exercise

October 6, 2004
Hutchinson Community College
Justice Theatre, Shears Technology Building
Hutchinson, Kansas

- 0730 – 0800 Registration and continental breakfast
- 0800 – 0830 Overview of law enforcement intelligence network (state & federal)
- 0830 – 0845 Rules of the exercise
- 0845 – 0900 Scenario briefing
- 0900 Exercise begins with Inject A
- 0930 – 1030 Exercise continues with agency updates
- 1030 – 1045 Break
- 1045 – 1145 Exercise continues with Inject B
- 1145 – 1215 Morning debriefing
- 1215 – 1300 Lunch on sight
- 1300 – 1400 Exercise continues with Inject C
- 1400 – 1500 Exercise activities conclude
- 1500 – 1600 Exercise debriefing
- 1600 – 1700 Comments and observations by evaluators
- 1700 Adjourn

Executive Summary

An act of agroterrorism would have severe and long-standing consequences to America's economy and to the well-being of our local communities, our state, and our nation. An outbreak of a foreign animal disease (FAD) --- either accidental or intentional --- would dramatically impact our food supply and would alter America's standing as the world's premiere supplier of food. It is not only important that we be prepared for an emergency response for an FAD outbreak, it is essential that we *prevent* such an event in the first place. Kansas law enforcement is playing a leadership role in the development and refinement of *proactive* measures to help protect agriculture, particularly the livestock industry, from an act of agroterrorism.

Based upon the lessons learned from the first agroterrorism simulation exercise, *Sudden Impact*, held 1/29/04 at Dodge City (KS), more emphasis must be placed on prevention rather than emergency response. Accordingly, a variance of replication research was conducted in the form of a second field exercise with a focus on suspicious activity, threat analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to law enforcement for appropriate action. It was also important to test the preparedness and capabilities in a jurisdiction that had not participated in the first exercise which primarily involved law enforcement agencies in western Kansas.

Prevention was the focus of the agroterrorism simulation exercise ***Endangered Species***.

State/federal intelligence databanks and analytical centers are now in place to track suspects, protest groups, and link suspicious activities in order to alert law enforcement to potential threats related to all forms of criminal activity, including acts of agroterrorism. The purpose of this sophisticated intelligence network is to provide law enforcement with advanced warning in order to take proper action in addressing potential threats, including acts of agroterrorism.

The law enforcement intelligence network includes:

- State: **KsLEIN** --- Kansas Law Enforcement Intelligence Network
 KsTIC --- Kansas Threat Integration Center
- Federal: **TSC** --- Terrorist Screening Center
 TTIC --- Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

Goals of *Endangered Species*:

Exercise *Endangered Species* was designed as an opportunity for local law enforcement to utilize this state/federal intelligence network beginning with the reporting of suspicious activity and culminating with the dissemination of intelligence indicating a potential terrorist attack at a public event (state fair). The goals of this exercise were straightforward:

- **interpret** broad information that became progressively more defined;
- **respond** to intelligence reports by reviewing existing security plans;
- **identify** security weaknesses and vulnerabilities of a public event; and
- **implement** corrective safeguards to address specific threats to an open public event, such as a state fair.

Summary of Scenario:

Endangered Species assumed a series of suspicious events were reported to local law enforcement in multiple states. Upon receiving the initial report of suspicious activity, analysts within the Kansas Threat Integration Center (KsTIC) evaluated and disseminated their conclusions to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Kansas City for appropriate action. It was further assumed that other named states would follow similar procedures.

The scenario was based on a series of reported suspicious activities being linked to one individual --- a 24-year-old male with international terrorist connections. The increasing threat potential of the suspect's actions led local law enforcement to query the National Crime

Information Center (NCIC), activate the JTTF, locate and observe the suspect, and eventually confront, interview, and arrest the suspect. With law enforcement's intervention, an international terrorism plot to attack a public event in the heartland was uncovered. The motivation for the attack was to affect the outcome of the upcoming national election. The heartland was chosen as the target of the attack because of its recognition as a "soft" target. In this exercise, the destructive agents (i.e., biological and explosives) represented the potential for loss of life and severe economic implications. *Note: The design of this scenario was the most logical sequence of events leading to an act of agroterrorism based upon the cumulative knowledge, law enforcement experience, and research data developed by the NIJ research team.*

July 20, 2004. A 24-year-old male was observed taking photos of a government facility in the Kansas City (KS) area. After being confronted by security officers, the man was identified and left the facility. Local police query the Kansas Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (KsLEIN) and the Kansas Threat Integration Center (KsTIC). A background investigation revealed that the suspect had been divorced by his ex-wife because of threatening behavior towards her and her attorney. The information was forwarded to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) in Washington, D.C.

August 15, 2004. Police in Oklahoma were called to investigate suspicious activity at the Texas County Fairgrounds in Guymon (OK). Although no activities were ongoing, a man and a woman were observed taking photographs of the site. Officers obtained identifying information about the suspects and their vehicle, and forwarded the information to the FBI.

August 22, 2004. A motel manager in Killen (TX) called police because a guest produced a large number of \$100 bills. He paid with a \$100 bill bearing red ink stains. The responding officer observed that the suspect's car was furtively backed into a motel parking stall.

Upon checking the license, the officer received a “hit” from NCIC-TSC. A terrorist threat was determined to be credible by the JTTF, and surveillance was initiated on the vehicle and its occupants, a man and woman.

While under surveillance, the occupants traveled to the county fair and made inquiries concerning procedures for the care of the livestock, the numbers of visitors that normally attend fair events, and specific questions related to the carnival activities. The suspects were confronted. Upon instructions from the TSC, the 24-year-old male suspect is ordered to be “detained” by the FBI. Through interview of the suspect, JTTF agents learned of an international terrorism plot to attack county and state fair events in the Midwest. Although no specific intelligence was gathered at this point, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) raised the terrorist threat alert to “HIGH” with special attention to the midwestern United States. Local officials were urged to review security procedures concerning animal and public health, security, and other safety procedures.

August 24, 2004. With the “HIGH” terrorist threat level in the Midwest, the FBI’s JTTF was dispatched to various counties throughout the state of Kansas to gather information at county fairs, racing events, and other public events which could attract large crowds.

August 30, 2004. JTTF members arrived in Hutchinson (KS), site of the upcoming state fair. Security procedures for the Kansas State Fair were reviewed, specifically those relating to animal health, physical security at the fair grounds, and procedures for screening visitors and vendors.

September 3, 2004. Intelligence reports indicated that an attack was imminent at an undisclosed state fair event in the Midwest. An anonymous caller to the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) stated that three (3) individuals had attempted to purchase large bags of

ammonium nitrate at a cooperative in Andale (KS). Because ammonium nitrate can be used as an active ingredient in homemade explosives, DHS alerted law enforcement in the states of Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. Local authorities were instructed to immediately reviewing security procedures and emergency response practices related to public health, animal health, and emergency management. Further consideration should be given to livestock handling procedures, food vendors, and physical security barriers at all public events, particularly state and county fairs. KsTIC raised the threat level to “SEVERE” throughout the state of Kansas.

After Action Report

This After Action Report (AAR) is a post-exercise document that describes the more important findings of the simulation exercise, *Endangered Species*. The report is based on evaluators' observations of the participants engaged in the exercise. Comparisons were drawn between the actual results of the participants' behavior and the anticipated outcomes. The purpose of the AAR is to provide recommendations for policymakers concerning the preparedness of Reno County (KS) to respond to terrorism. The report also provides insight into how law enforcement could strengthen its awareness and its responses to early warning signs of terrorism threats.

The AAR is divided into two sections, each providing findings and recommendations made by the evaluation team. In the first section, the dynamics of participants will be critiqued by evaluating their decisions and responses, based on the following: (1) level of cooperation between participants; (2) issues which influenced response actions; and (3) major decisions and their consequences. The goal is to describe interactions of the participants and their ability to solve problems given the changing nature of the scenario during the exercise. Secondly, a synopsis of findings and recommendations is provided reflecting the ability of law enforcement

to develop information and disseminate intelligence. It is recognized that obtaining information about terrorists' identities, plans, and objectives is paramount for preventing acts of terrorism. The objective of the exercise was to provide insight into the relationship between intelligence and prevention. Consequently, the AAR provides an evaluation of the participants' abilities: (1) to receive and assimilate information; (2) to assess the level of threat based on the information; and (3) to refine the information into meaningful intelligence.

Findings and Recommendations:

1. Level of Cooperation, Major Decisions and Consequences. During the exercise, the level of cooperation between different agencies and their personnel was *exceptional*. Preparation to respond to a potential terrorism threat requires effective communication between all those involved, and also requires each public service agency to acknowledge its responsibilities and the expectation of other agencies. All four evaluators agreed that participants understood their responsibilities, and were seriously engaged in carrying out their agency's mission throughout the exercise.

Below is a list of tasks performed by the participants during the exercise:

- utilizing databases with names, phone/page/fax/cellular numbers, e-mail and postal addresses of everyone involved in the problem-solving process;
- assigning roles for those involved in their agency's response;
- receiving and developing critical information concerning threats;
- determining the origin, scope, and impact newly-presented information;
- assisting law enforcement by providing logistical support crucial to the criminal investigation;
- monitoring the threat situation and taking appropriate action;

- updating those affected on a continuous basis; and
- contacting outside agencies (i.e., emergency services, suppliers of goods and services, appropriate labor forces, governmental agencies, and the media).

As the exercise progressed, it became apparent that swift communication among agencies was essential for accomplishing the overall mission. Each participant understood the value of establishing clear lines of communication at the command post and back to their agency headquarters. However, language barriers developed as participants experienced difficulty with terms, acronyms, and word definitions used by other work groups. Participants also identified the need for effective communication with diverse ethnic groups that will be impacted by any terrorist threat. Language barriers must be addressed in any crisis planning.

Recommendations:

1. The news media is the most powerful delivery vehicle in the communications spectrum. For this reason, law enforcement should develop strategies to involve the media in planning and policymaking. Ideally, law enforcement and the media should form a partnership to develop proactive techniques to effectively manage communications when a threat of terrorism strikes. Two important questions that were identified in the exercise:

- How should information be provided to the public; and
- How should information be presented to prevent rumors, half-truths, and over-reaction by the public?

2. Developing a common data dictionary is an essential prerequisite for effective information sharing among law enforcement agencies and other government organizations involved in crisis management.

3. Businesses located in close proximity to a potential-affected area should be consulted by law enforcement for input in the decision-making process. As the threat assessment process develops, coordination with affected businesses should be a primary consideration. Two important questions were raised during the exercise: (1) should businesses be given the option of continuing normal operations if not immediately affected by a threat of terrorism; and (2) if the threat level is raised to severe, how will it affect business activities? These questions must be addressed in any threat scenario, either in a real threat or in a field exercise.

In terms of design for future exercises, we suggest a two-fold procedure is suggested:

- Participants who do not normally work together should be placed in separate rooms prior to activation of the EOC; and
- Information should be provided only to those groups who would normally receive that information, rather than presenting it to the entire group at the exercise. This would more accurately demonstrate potential gaps in communication and more clearly define the need for improvements and changes.

Sources of Information, Threat Assessment, and Intelligence Refinement:

The first exercise objective was to “*measure the capacity to receive and refine intelligence data.*” Prior to the exercise, KBI Special Agent Scott Ferris and FBI Special Agent Dave Cudmore provided an overview of the state and federal law enforcement intelligence networks, describing how information is received, how it is analyzed into meaningful intelligence, and how intelligence is then disseminated to the field. In most instances, inquiries into the state and federal intelligence networks originate at the local law enforcement level. This intelligence network is triggered by an NCIC inquiry from a police officer, a deputy sheriff, or a highway patrol trooper.

There were questions and some confusion about the organization of and process for distributing information to the public prior of an actual event. Specifically, it was not entirely clear which agency's Public Information Team (PIT) or officer (PIO) would serve as the lead information source for the media, nor how the various PITs (i.e., animal health, public health, FBI, local EOC, etc.) would coordinate the flow of information to ensure accuracy and consistency.

Recommendations:

1. There is a basic assumption that once intelligence is disseminated, a response will be forthcoming. However, an appropriate response by local law enforcement is more likely if the receiver of the intelligence report has a clear understanding of the intelligence network, and the checks and balances involved in classifying the threat as credible. This field exercise confirms the need for a **greater priority on awareness training for local law enforcement of the state and federal intelligence network (e.g. KsLEIN, KsTIC, TSC, and TTIC)**. Officers need to understand both how threat information is analyzed and the analysts' efforts to track and link terrorist activity. Computer support must be updated on a regular basis through 24-hour help desk, newsletters, online help features, and lists of frequently asked questions. It was clear that the state and federal intelligence networks are not serving local law enforcement in the manner in which they were originally designed. In order to be an effective tool for terrorism intervention, the intelligence network (e.g. KsLEIN, KsTIC, TSC, and TTIC) must be as clearly understood as is NCIC. **This is a major lesson learned from this exercise.**

2. While the FBI is responsible for investigating terrorism in the United States, organizational and legal obstacles could exist which would delay the intelligence process. Procedures should be developed to enhance the role of local law enforcement in the timely

receipt of intelligence and its implication for the threat of terrorism. To further enhance the nation's overall capacity for the prevention of terrorism, local law enforcement leaders, such as the Reno County Sheriff and Hutchinson Chief of Police, should make **aggressive** recruitment of human intelligence sources one of their highest priorities for protecting their local communities. Additionally, formation of partnerships or joint task forces between local and state law enforcement agencies is necessary for developing information, analyzing data, and taking action based on the dissemination of intelligence.

3. Dissemination of intelligence must be performed in a manner consistent with applicable laws. The Kansas Attorney General's office should clarify what information can be shared, and direct maximum dissemination of terrorist-related intelligence to decision makers, including local law enforcement. Further, the Attorney General, KBI, highway patrol, local law enforcement, and university police should work closely together to create an effective system of monitoring the visa status of foreign students and visitors.

4. Threat alerts, prevention, and development of intelligence should be considered a top priority by law enforcement and their respective communities. If threat alerts are disregarded and terrorism intelligence is not taken seriously, our system of homeland security will be compromised. Prevention is a matter of developing intelligence, identifying potential threats, and taking necessary action to suppress those threat elements.

General Observations

Based upon observations and assessments from the evaluators of *Endangered Species*, the following is a general description of the behaviors and actions of each group and the collective function of the command center that participated in this exercise:

Law Enforcement

1. Officers in the law enforcement group addressed most items on the task list contained in the exercise playbook, and worked through the changing scenario taking aggressive action when appropriate.

2. Early in the exercise, information flow and dissemination of intelligence was somewhat restricted. Non-law enforcement personnel (i.e., public health, animal health, state fair board) had to actively seek out information rather than being part of the information flow. As the exercise progressed, the incident commander (Reno County Sheriff) made necessary changes to ensure all agencies provided input for critical decisions.

3. This exercise provided a unique and valuable forum to share information and learn about the expertise of other agencies, such as animal health, public health, emergency management, etc. Participating law enforcement agencies should continue this multi-agency development by designing future training opportunities related to homeland security. Any training event should include local, state, and federal law enforcement, as well as all first responders and public service agencies.

Animal Health

1. Early in the exercise, animal health participants were not involved, and they only became involved when they contacted the EOC and offered assistance. Further, animal health was not represented on the LEPC, and was not integrated into the emergency planning process. As the scenario developed, the EOC struggled with the decision-making process in the event of a foreign animal disease (FAD). It was noted that the Kansas Livestock Commissioner is the authority for ordering a “stop movement” and quarantines within the state of Kansas. The

vulnerable period of time during the possibility of a FAD is the 24-hour period just prior to receipt of test results from the federal animal disease laboratory at Plum Island (NY). Any misjudgment or failure to prepare or failure to act during this period of time will have major ramifications in the event of an actual FAD outbreak.

2. The animal health group thoroughly addressed the potential issues. The KAHD group was well organized and fully prepared to deal with issues related to the care and well-being of animals at the state fair. KAHD had developed well-designed emergency procedures through participation of numerous field exercises, development of strong partnerships with livestock producers throughout the state, and positive interaction with local, state, and federal law enforcement.

3. Animal health representatives could have been more assertive in communicating their potential response activities to the EOC. The EOC must incorporate KAHD's response plans into their overall discussions and decision-making process.

4. It was not clear if Reno County has an FAD committee or response team. If one exists, how would it be integrated into the EOC? When the focus turned to animal health emergency procedures, there was no discussion of euthanasia efforts. There was also significant disagreement over burial procedures with no clear resolution in the event of an FAD.

Emergency Management and Fire Departments

1. Evaluators observed that a need existed for a formal communication plan by emergency management personnel (EM). Considerable time elapsed before EM personnel were included as an active participant at the EOC.

2. Fire department participants were well organized and prepared for any emergency response event that appeared in the changing scenario. The fire departments had very detailed plans for dealing with potential situations that might arise in the exercise, and they expressed a clear understanding of their role and responsibilities.

3. As the scenario developed and the terrorist threat became more imminent, the group discussed that KsTIC had raised the statewide threat level to SEVERE. However, there was no follow-up discussion as to the impact or implication of the elevated state declaration.

4. The EOC was opened only for support of law enforcement functions in the early phase of the exercise. However, it was not until late in the exercise that specific assignments were given to emergency management personnel.

Public Health

1. Public health personnel were not integrated into the communication process early in the scenario and had to actively seek information on their own, rather than being a part of the regular communication cycle.

2. Public health representatives indicated they were responsible for inspecting food vendors at the state fair, and that it would be appropriate to conduct background checks on all food-service vendors prior to issuing a clearance pass.

3. Public health was concerned about the water supply as potential source of contamination.

4. Public health participants were not fully engaged in the scenario until midway through the exercise. Upon arrival at the EOC, public health personnel should immediately review their emergency response procedures, and begin developing a number of response options based upon

the emerging threat. These options should be clearly communicated to the incident commander for his consideration in addressing and resolving the overall threat.

5. Possible burial of animals on state fair property was a concern, and the proximity of the proposed burial site to public water supplies was an issue for public health.

6. Public health recognized the need to secure hospital emergency rooms in advance, and to determine the extent law enforcement assistance would be required. In dealing with patients with disease symptoms, EMS opted to co-locate and treat patients with similar symptoms in an area outside the hospital to prevent the hospital from becoming contaminated. Further, EMS recognized the need to establish its own decontamination station because the fire department would be unable to assist due to their own decontamination responsibilities.

State Fair Board

1. The Kansas State Fair Board was well prepared with information concerning the logistics and operations of the state fair. For example, the board had detailed information concerning the Department of Corrections (DOC) inmates who were assigned to various work details at the state fair, and this possible security issue was addressed during the exercise.

2. As the terrorist threat level developed during the scenario, it was not clear what agency or individual had authority to make major decisions, such as cancellation of the state fair. It was mentioned that the governor's office would have the final decision about whether or not to cancel the state fair, but the governor's office was not made aware of this possibility during the exercise.

3. The state fair must have ready access to and advance information of specific 4-H events and open-class livestock entries to determine the identities of persons participating in state

fair competitions. During the exercise, unidentified fair participants and their farm animals appeared at the fairgrounds without prior notice.

4. At public events, such as a state fair, direct communication with exhibitors, foodservice vendors, and miscellaneous vendors is a critical issue in any homeland security plan. This security element was absent during the exercise. Clarification is needed as to how these groups are screened, background checks are conducted, and how this group would receive threat information, including the possibility of the state fair being cancelled. The State Fair Board was not significantly involved in the early public information efforts or the follow-up interviews with the media. The possibility of the state fair being cancelled is a major issue and should be addressed in the planning phase prior to the actual event.

5. Advance procedures is needed concerning the extent of intelligence about a terrorist threat should be in place and this intelligence should be shared with the State Fair Board.

Participants List for Field Exercise *Endangered Species*:

Livestock Industry:

Excel Corporation Jane Westerman

Local Government:

Ford County Sheriff Office Sheriff Dean Bush
Undersheriff James Lane

Reno County Sheriff Office Sheriff Randy Henderson
Undersheriff Dennis Stofer
Sgt. Darian Campbell
Sgt. Jesse Downard
Sgt. Brian Mothes
Capt. Dennis Radke
Sgt. Lance Smith
Capt. Joleen Smith

Hutchinson Fire Department Chief Kim Forbes
Deputy Chief Mike Patterson
Capt. Mark Cessna
Capt. Jeff Deal

Reno County LEPC Roger Costa
Conrad Koehler
Lisa Loeb
Jeff Martin
Tony Scheuler
Larry Sharp
Steve Albert
Jason Jones

Edwards County Emergency Management Jay Dill

Reno County Commission Commissioner Frances Garcia
Administrator Ed Williams

Reno County Emergency Management Bill Guy
Pam Clarke

Hutchinson Police Department Chief Dick Heitschmidt
Capt. Dave Higdon
Lt. Troy Hoover
Sgt. Rob McClarty

Reno County Information Technology Mike Mathews

Participants List, continued:

Reno County Emergency Management	Randy Miller, Director
Reno County Emergency Communications	Dale Kuhn, 911 Director Joanne Angell, Assistant 911 Director
South Hutchinson Police Department	Chief Scott Jones
Hutchinson City Manager	Joe Palacios
Reno County Health Department	Dan Partridge Judy Seltzer Bob Hickman
Cowley County Emergency Management	Brian Stone
Kingman Emergency Management	Jake Graber
Hutchinson Public Works	Barry Becker
Reno County Public Works	Director Dean Chestnut
Reno County Fire Chief's Association	Jeff Fountain
Barton County Emergency Management	Amy Miller

State Agencies:

Kansas Bureau of Investigation	Deputy Director Terry Knowles SAC Bruce Mellor SSA Scott Ferris SSA Jeff Newsum SA Ryan Boyer Carrie Clark
Kansas Animal Health Department	Commissioner George Teagarden Dr. Sam Graham Dr. Paul Grosdidier Bill Lynn Harry Stephens Steve Wilterding Dr. Bill Bryant Ray Burgett Dave Cuthbertson Karen Domer

Participants List, continued:

Kansas Dept. of Health and Environment	Dr. Gail Hansen
KEMA	Don Button
Kansas Homeland Security	Terri Ploger-McCool, Coordinator Lance Jones Jim Leftwich Matt Mercer Dennis Colsden
Kansas Highway Patrol	Melanie Lawrence Lt. Robin Reitmeyer Lt. Randy Moon
Kansas State University	Dr. Ron Trewyn, NABC Dr. Jerry Jaax, NABC
Kansas Fish and Game	Jerry Schmidt
Cheney State Park	Jody Schwartz
Kansas State Fair Board	Denny Stoecklein Debbie Anderson
Kansas Farm Bureau	Susan Shipman
Kansas Department of Agriculture	Dan Riley Lisa Taylor
<u>Federal Agencies:</u>	
Federal Bureau of Investigation	SA David Cudmore SA Mike Miller
National Weather Service	Jeff Hutton
U.S. Department of Agriculture	Dr. Kevin Varner Dr. Brian Archer Dr. Phil Erwin Dr. Hallie Hasel
U.S. Attorney's Office	Todd Voter Mike Christensen
Senator Pat Robert's Office	Carla Wilson

Participants List, continued:

National Institute of Justice	Dr. Sandra L. Woerle
FEMA	Jessica Frasher
Army National Guard	LtCol Tim Marlar
American Red Cross	Barb Swann Jason Jones

Exercise Evaluators:

Kansas State University	Dr. Abbey Nutsch
Kansas State University	Ms. Jackie McClaskey
Washburn University	Dr. Gary Bayens
Kansas State University, NABC	Dr. Mary Vanier

Media:

Hutchinson News	Greg Halling
KSKU Radio	Lucky Kidd
KWCH TV	Matt Mauro

Miscellaneous:

Hutchinson Regional Hospital	Chris Hill Connie Nichols
Dillon's Food Store	George Jacobs

Catering:

Sparky's Sports Bar and Grill
Great Western Dining Service, Inc.